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JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY AND THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: A COMMENT ON
MIRANDA AND DICKERSON
RicHARD H. FALLON,

JR.*

What kinds of reasons should the Supreme Court consider in deciding constitutional cases? Does the Court understand its own proper
functions? In view of the role that the Court actually plays, do standards of judicial legitimacy need to be reconsidered?
Some of my earliest thinking about questions such as these came
in reading the work of Harry Wellington' and in participating in his
seminar at Yale Law School. Against the familiar understanding that
the Supreme Court simply "interprets" a static Constitution, Wellington has argued that the Court's role in constitutional cases is similar to
that of a common law court that must develop doctrine in light of
evolving public values. 2 In his classic article on the common law
method in constitutional adjudication, 3 he suggests that the legitimacy
ofjudge-made constitutional doctrine is somehow analogous to that of
the common law.4 Just as the implicit and explicit rules of common
law regimes authorize judicial law-making, so do the implicit rules of
our constitutional practice authorize the Supreme Court to perform
functions that go beyond mere historical and textual exegesis in developing constitutional doctrine. But the Court, Wellington has main-

* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Dan Meltzer, Bill
Stuntz, and Lloyd Weinreb for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Justin Deabler and Greg Rapawy for excellent research assistance.
1. Especially influential was Harry Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
2.

See, e.g., HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 77-123 (Yale

Univ. Press 1990) (describing "public morality" as a source of law within a common-lawlike method of constitutional adjudication); Wellington, supra note 1, at 265-311 (devel-

oping a common-law-like account of constitutional adjudication).
See Wellington, supra note 1.
4. See id. at 265-66 (discussing bases for claims of legitimacy in constitutional law
and suggesting the pertinence of analogies to common law methodology).
3.
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tamined, should act only on grounds of principle, not policy, 5 and it
6
should recognize stringent obligations of articulate reason-giving.
In this essay, I consider some questions ofjudicial role andjudicial
legitimacy as framed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Dickerson v. United States.7 In Dickerson, the Court held that Congress acted
unconstitutionally when it passed a statute that essentially instructed
the federal courts to ignore Miranda v. Arizonas in determining
whether confessions are voluntary and thus admissible into evidence. 9
By a vote of 7-2,10 the Justices re-affirmed Miranda, partly because it
had become woven into the fabric of American law and culture,"1 even
though a number ofJustices in the majority apparently would not have
12
approved the decision in the first instance.
As Justice Scalia emphasized in a bitter dissent,1 3 the Court opinion in Dickerson was almost painfully cryptic. The majority pointedly
declined to hold that every confession obtained without a Miranda
warning is coerced or involuntary or that "the use at trial of a voluntary
confession, even when a Miranda warning or its equivalent has failed to
be given-violates the Constitution." 14 For Justice Scalia, the Court's
reticence proved that it had overreached. In his view, the Court had
no business mandating the exclusion of confessions that did not violate the Constitution; its decisions to the contrary were "illegitima[te]. 1 5 The majority obviously disagreed, but its opinionauthored by Chief Justice Rehnquist-made no real effort to explain
why.
Taking up the legitimacy challenge as framed by Justice Scalia, I
shall argue in this essay that the substantive decision in Dickerson was
5. See id. at 265-311 (defending judicial reliance on principles rooted in conventional morality, but not on policies, to give content to constitutional commands).
6. See id. at 295-304 (criticizing the Court's failure to provide articulate justifications for its decisions in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).

7.
8.

530 U.S. 428 (2000).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).

9. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 415-419.
10. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia,joined
by Justice Thomas, dissented.
11.
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 419-420.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 420-434 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 428.
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indeed a legitimate one, but that the Court's authority to render it
depends on unwritten as well as written constitutional norms. Judicial
legitimacy, in other words, is not wholly a function of the written Constitution. If the Court understands the nature and foundations of its
role, the majority's largely mute response to Justice Scalia's legitimacy
challenge suggests that the Justices are not prepared to offer an articulate, principled defense, a state of affairs that is highly regrettable, but
also understandable in light of the multiple challenges that the Court
confronts. Judicial legitimacy, I shall argue, depends on a potentially
unstable conjunction of public acceptance, substantive justice, and articulate justification. Dickerson slighted the judicial obligation of articulate justification. This is a serious failing, but the Court must struggle
to meet other standards as well. In Dickerson and elsewhere, assessment
of the legitimacy of the Court's performance requires a sense of context and proportion. Judicial legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing
proposition.
I.

MIRANDA AND RESPONSES THERETO

To understand Dickerson, it is necessary first to understand Miranda and, what is more, the background to Miranda. The Supreme
Court has consistently held that coerced confessions may not lawfully
be introduced into evidence in criminal trials. 16 For much of the twentieth century, the Court rested its holdings on the Due Process
Clause. 17 In a long line of decisions, the Court prescribed an assessment of all relevant circumstances to determine "whether a defendant's will was overborne."' 8 In Malloy v. Hogan,19 decided in 1964,
the Court ruled for the first time that the Due Process Clause "incorporates"-and thus makes applicable against the states as well as the federal government-the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
compelled self-incrimination. 20 But this shift of focus from the Due
Process to the Self-Incrimination Clause had little practical signifi16. This has been the rule at least since 1936. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 286 (1936).
17. See, e.g., Stein v. NewYork, 346 U.S. 156, 171-88 (1953); Brown v. Mississippi,

297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936).
18.

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 413 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,

226 (1973)).
19.

378 U.S. 1 (1964).

20.

See id. at 6-11.
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cance. The central question continued to involve whether a particular
confession was voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Then came Miranda.21 In Miranda, the Court recognized that
what Dickerson called "the advent of modem custodial police interrogation" 22 brought an increased risk of intrusions on individual liberty
and of confessions obtained by coercion. 23 In order to ensure that the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination was implemented
effectively, Miranda prescribed that, for confessions to be admissible
into evidence, police must first give what have come to be called "Miranda warnings" or their equivalents. A suspect must be notified that
he "has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
'24
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
From the outset, Miranda drew criticism, largely on the ground
that it excessively handicapped the police, but partly also on the basis
that its central holding is not a true "constitutional" rule in one sense
of that term. 25 Even on the surface, Miranda's insistence on detailed
warnings looks legislative. 2 6 Indeed, the Court itself suggested that
Congress or the state legislatures might replace Miranda's prescribed
scheme of warnings with other regimens that are "equally effective" in
apprising criminal suspects of their right to silence. 2 7 To be sure,
there are threads of analysis suggesting that the Miranda Court re21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Prior to Miranda, in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964), the Court found a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel where a criminal suspect held in police custody "has requested and
been denied the opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent." The Court's
cases involving the rights of suspects subject to custodial questioning thus exhibited a
curious movement involving the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel before coming to rest, in Miranda, on the privilege against self-incrimination.
See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
22. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 413.
23. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58.
24. Id. at 479.
25.
See, e.g., Joseph Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REv. 100, 106-11, 145 (1985) (characterizing the
Miranda rules as prophylactic and questioning their constitutional legitimacy).
26. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 430 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the "detailed code promulgated in Miranda"as "legislative").
27.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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garded its holding as constitutionally mandated.2 8 But other central
elements of the Court's opinion are hard to reconcile with the notion,
widely embraced by critics, 29 that the Court's only legitimate function

is to identify the Constitution's meaning and apply it to the facts of
individual cases. For example, the Court appeared to accept that the
meaning of the relevant constitutional language would best be specified as forbidding compelled confessions, 30 yet frankly acknowledged
that "in these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to
have been involuntary in traditional terms."3 1 Even apart from this explicit statement, it would seem obvious that not every confession obtained in the absence of a Miranda warning is in fact coerced or
involuntary. On the contrary, in subsequent cases, the Court itself fre32
quently described the Miranda rule as "prophylactic."
Two years after Miranda, Congress responded by enacting a statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, that effectively purported to overrule the Court's
decision in criminal cases in federal court.3 3 In essence, § 3501 provides that in determining the admissibility of confessions obtained during custodial interrogation, federal courts should consider only
whether the confessions were voluntary.3 4 If so, the confessions should
be admitted, Mirandato the contrary notwithstanding. TheJustice Department, however, concluded that § 3501 was unconstitutional and
28. See, e.g., id. at 458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice); id. at 461 ("An individual swept
from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and
subjected to the techniques of persuasion [characteristically employed by the police)
cannot be otherwise than under a compulsion to speak.").
29. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 25, at 163-64 (rejecting as illegitimate those judicially promulgated prophylaxes "that can be neither justified as an exercise ofjudicial
rulemaking at the nonconstitutional level nor reinterpreted to express actual constitutional requirements").
30. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.").
31. Id. at 438 (discussing the "necessity for procedures which assure that the [suspect] is accorded his privilege").
32. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984).
33. See generallyYale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?,85 CoRNEL.
L. Rxv. 883 (2000) (describing the legislative history).
34.

See id. at 929-30.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

therefore determined not to invoke it.3 5 Perhaps surprisingly, the Justice Department's non-invocation policy continued through all subsequent changes of administration. 3 6 As a result, 3501 had little or no
operative effect until recently, when a federal court of appeals ruled
sua sponte that the statute, not Miranda, governed the admissibility of
confessions in federal court. 37 In Dickerson, the Supreme Court reviewed that decision and reversed it.

11.

DICKERsON

Dickerson rendered two significant holdings. First, the Court held
that Miranda was a "constitutional" ruling in some sense of that term
and, accordingly, that it could not be overruled by Congress.3 8 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on precedents applying Miranda to state courts. 39 By common agreement, the Court has a
"supervisory power" over the lower federal courts, pursuant to which it
can impose rules of practice and procedure. 40 The Court has no comparable power over state courts."' By applying Miranda to state courts,
Dickerson reasoned, the Court had necessarily implied that Miranda ar42
ticulated what the Court at one point called a "constitutional rule."
It would be a mistake, however, to view this terminology in isolation. Despite its insistence that Miranda had constitutional foundations, the Dickerson Court was pointedly elusive about the precise
relation of Miranda to the Constitution. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, the majority employed a variety of formulations, but declined to
35. In June of 1969, the Department ofJustice, headed by Attorney General John
Mitchell, issued a memorandum defending the statute. See id. at 925-29. But the Department quickly backed off. In a concurring opinion in Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 465 (1994),Justice Scalia observed that "with limited exceptions the provision
has been studiously avoided by every Administration, not only in this court but in the
lower courts." In a letter to Congress in 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno stated without explanation that ' 3501 was unconstitutional. See United States v. Dickerson, 166
F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 512 U.S. 452 (2000).
36. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 463 (Scalia, J., concurring).
37. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
38. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 415.
39. See id. (citing, inter alia, Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990)).
40. See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 415; Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426
(1996).
41.
See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts have no
supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct
wrongs of constitutional dimension."); Ciccnia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1958).
42. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 416.
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explicate any of them: "The Court today insists that the decision in
Miranda is a 'constitutional' one; that it has 'constitutional underpinnings'; a 'constitutional basis' and a 'constitutional origin'; that it is
'constitutionally based'; and that it announced a 'constitutional
rule."' 43 But the Court agreed that "the Constitution does not require
44
... the particular Mirandawarnings";
other safeguards of the underlying constitutional right might suffice as well.
In response to the argument that Mirandacannot state a true constitutional rule if other safeguards might substitute for those specified
by the Court, an analogy to the Court's holdings concerning procedural due process in administrative hearings45 springs to mind: although
the Constitution demands a set of procedures adequate to provide due
process, no single package is uniquely required; all that matters is that
the minimum is met in one way or another.4 6 Upon analysis, however,
the analogy fails for a reason noted by justice Scalia. In a case finding
that a scheme of administrative procedures does not provide due process, the Court holds that the Constitution is violated. By contrast, in
Dickerson the majority pointedly refused to say, despite being baited to
do so by Justice Scalia, that "the use at trial of a voluntary confession,
even when a Mirandawarning or its equivalent has failed to be given
...
violates the Constitution." 47 According to the majority, "we need
48
not go farther than Mirandato decide this case."
Having insisted that Miranda itself gave Dickerson all the support
that it required, provided only that Miranda remained good law, the
Court had no choice but to consider the continuing validity of Miranda
itself. In its second principal holding, the Court re-affirmed Miranda
largely, if not exclusively, on the basis of stare decisis: "Whether or not
we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were
we addressing the issue in the first instance .... [w] e do not think there
49
is [sufficient] justification for overruling Miranda."
43.

Id. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

44. Id. at 417 n.6.
45. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-36 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970).
46. See, e.g., HenryJ. Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279
(1975) (noting that "if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing or even
eliminating another" procedural element).
47. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 419.
49. Id. at 419.
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AN UNMET CHALLENGE

Frustratingly, the Court in Dickerson never faced up to the challenge posed by the dissent: if the Court was unprepared to say that "the
use at trial of a voluntary confession, even when a Miranda warning or
its equivalent has failed to be given,"50 violates the Constitution, then
how could the Court be justified in imposing the Miranda rules? Was
Justice Scalia not correct when he insisted that the Court's only proper
role is that of applying the Constitution and, as in Marbuy v.
Madison,5 1 refusing to give effect to legislative enactments that violate
52
constitutional commands?
Several of the briefs filed in Dickerson urged the Court to assert an
authority to issue "prophylactic" rules that go beyond the Constitution's actual requirements but nonetheless promote constitutional values. 53 The basic idea is intuitively simple. Indeed, no case offers a
better illustration than Miranda itself: the Constitution prohibits the
introduction into evidence of coerced confessions, but courts are
poorly equipped to determine on a case-by-case basis which confessions are truly the product of compulsion; to ensure that too many
coerced confessions are not admitted, the Court should therefore be
able to lay down a bright-line rule that errs on the side of over-enforcing the Constitution's prohibitions.
The problem, of course, is that merely to state the rationale for
prophylactic rules is not to demonstrate their "legitimacy. '54 The
question of what legitimacy is and how it ought to be measured is a
difficult and, to some extent, a contestable one, which I shall address
at length below. Here, suffice it to say that the question of judicial
legitimacy in the first instance involves fidelity to law.55 With respect to
constitutional law and the judiciary's lawful powers, Justice Scalia's
front-line position appears to be straightforward: the Constitution is
law, indeed paramount law, and it authorizes and commands the
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 420 (emphasis added) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 420422 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (taking this position).
See id. at 428 (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("Petitioner and the United States contend

that there is nothing at all exceptional, much less unconstitutional, about the Court's

adopting prophylactic rules to buttress constitutional fights ...").
54. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 25, at 123-56 (denying the legitimacy of the kind of
prophylactic rule involved in Miranda).
55. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Dickerson proceeds on this assumptionfor example, when he characterizes the defense of prophylactic rules as an attempt "to
validate a lawless practice." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 428-429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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courts to apply the Constitution's mandates to all justiciable cases; but
the Constitution gives the judicial branch no authority to make law,
not commanded by the Constitution, that could prevail over legislation
56
enacted by Congress pursuant to constitutionally delegated powers.
Indeed, for Justice Scalia, for the Supreme Court to refuse to give effect to a statute displacing ajudicially crafted rule not required by the
Constitution itself violates the separation of powers and thus is
57
"illegidima[te] .-

Despite his front-line position concerning the limits of legitimate
judicial authority, Justice Scalia has acknowledged that a "pragmatic
exception"5 8 must be made for stare decisis- the judicial policy of
adhering to at least some precedents that were initially erroneous.5 9
In his view, a judicial power to invoke stare decisis appears to have
acquired legitimacy-in a manner that Justice Scalia has not fully explained-by what he once termed "a sort of intellectual adverse possession. '60 If precedents, or at least some precedents, have achieved
legitimacy even if they were not initially correct, the possibility arises
that judicial authority to develop and enforce prophylactic rules might
achieve legitimacy through a similar process. As if to cut off this possible line of argument, Justice Scalia argued, again without response
from the Dickerson majority, that there are only a very few truly "prophylactic" doctrines in constitutional law. 61 According to him, the
others touted to the Court as prophylactic instead reflect interpretations of particular constitutional provisions as encompassing sweep62
ingly protective policies.
56. See id. at 421-422.
57. Id. at 428.
58. ANTONIN SCAUA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
140 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
59. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that a rule's "'wide acceptance in the legal culture'" is "adequate
reason not to overrule [it]"). For an illuminating discussion of stare decisis and its role
in the constitutional scheme, see Henry Paul Monaghan, State Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 723 (1988).
60. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265

(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See Dickeron, 530 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
62. See id. To give just one example, Justice Scalia maintained that when the First
Amendment is properly interpreted, it bars governmental regulations that are likely to
have a chilling effect on certain kinds of speech, not merely regulations that directly
prohibit the kinds of speech that are of ultimate constitutional value. See id.
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The Court's silence in response to Justice Scalia's attacks on Miranda's legitimacy gives salience to the questions with which I began,
about whether the Court understands its own role in the constitutional
scheme or is capable of furnishing an honest, coherent defense.
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE

If Justice Scalia were correct that the Supreme Court's single entrenched role since Marbuqy v. Madison63 is to identify the Constitution's meaning and apply that meaning to resolve individual cases,
then an asserted power to craft "prophylactic" rules would mark a radical and properly suspect departure from the norm. In fact, however,
Justice Scalia's premise will not withstand close analysis.
A.

ConstitutionalImplementation

As I have argued elsewhere, 64 the Supreme Court has at least two
entrenched functions. One is to interpret the Constitution and specify
its meaning. 65 The other is to implement the Constitution through
the crafting and application of rules, tests, and doctrines that reflect,
but do not always perfectly embody, the Constitution's meaning. 6 6 Although the Supreme Court seldom draws a clear distinction between
these two roles, recognition of the difference is vital to understanding
a number of deeply rooted constitutional doctrines.
Stare decisis
Consider first the principle of stare decisis, to which I have alluded already. In Dickerson, all of the Justices agreed that the Court is
generally bound to follow its own precedents, including those that
were wrongly decided in the first instance, absent a demonstration of
especially serious error.67 If the Court's only proper function were to
interpret the Constitution, specify its meaning correctly, and apply that
meaning to decide individual cases, adherence to erroneous interpretations could not be justified. The doctrine of stare decisis must draw
its justification from an acceptance of the Court's responsibility to en63.

5 U.S. 137 (1803).

64.

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (Harvard Univ.

Press 2001).
65. See id.
66. I have previously developed this theme in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REv. 54 (1997).
67. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 419, 431-432 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sure effective implementation of constitutional values by maintaining
68
predictability, fairness, and reasonable stability in constitutional law.
Judicial Compromise
Judicial compromise is sometimes necessary to produce "opinions
of the Court" and, thus, workable constitutional doctrine. 69 But if
each of the Justices' sole and overriding obligation were to afford what
she took to be a perfectly accurate specification of constitutional meaning, compromise would be impossible. To the extent that compromise
about how to frame a constitutional standard is permissible, the justification must reside in the Court's responsibility to implement the Constitution effectively. Successful constitutional implementation requires
relatively clear opinions of the Court, not a disjointed series of essays
by individual Justices on the correct specification of constitutional
meaning.
Constitutional Remedies
The Constitution includes virtually no express provisions establishing remedies for constitutional violations. Yet the Court has crafted a
broad range of remedies against the government and its officials, including not only injunctions 70 and money damages, 7 1 but also rules
that call for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. 72 In doing so,
the Court has claimed authority to devise remedies that are appropriate-as well as those that are strictly necessary-to promote constitu73
tionally grounded values and interests.
68.

See Charles Fried, ConstitutionalDoctrine, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1140, 1156 (1994);

Monaghan, supra note 59, at 748-52.
69. See, e.g., WELLINGTON, supra note 2, at 81-82; Fallon, supra note 66, at 59-60.
70. See, eg., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1908).
71. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971).
72. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule traces to Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). For discussion of its deterrent rationale, see Daniel J. Meltzer,
Deterring ConstitutionalViolations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as
Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. R-v. 247, 267-78 (1988).
73. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (expressly rejecting "respondents' formulation
of the question [whether the victim of a Fourth Amendment violation could maintain a
federal cause of action for damages] as whether the availability of money damages is
necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment"); id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring) (for-

mulating the question as "whether compensatory relief is 'necessary' or 'appropriate' to
the vindication of the" underlying Fourth Amendment right).
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Standards of Review
Many of the tests promulgated by the Supreme Court establish
conditions for the award ofjudicial relief, not specifications of constitutional meaning. A particularly plain example is the "some evidence"
test used by courts in challenges under the Due Process Clause to certain rulings by administrative decision-makers, such as prison disciplinary boards. 74 Under the "some evidence" test, a court will uphold an
administrative decision, such as an imposition of sanctions, as long as
there is some evidence to support it-even if the decision was erroneous or even willful or malicious. The "some evidence" test is a poor
candidate to specify constitutional meaning. 7 5 Surely the underlying
constitutional norm-which speaks in the first instance to the officials
directly empowered to effect a deprivation of life, liberty, or property,
and not to reviewing courts-calls for fair process, not merely process
in which "some evidence" is adduced to support the result. Again, justification for the "some evidence" rule must rest on concerns of sensible constitutional implementation. The Court has good reason not to
mandate searching judicial review of relatively minor administrative
decisions. To some extent, it is entitled to share its responsibility for
implementing the Constitution with officials in other branches.
Underenforced Constitutional Norms
In describing standards of review that fail to ensure full judicial
enforcement of underlying constitutional norms, I both echo and embrace Larry Sager's more general thesis that there are numerous instances in which courts, for what he calls institutional reasons, fail to
enforce constitutional norms to their "full conceptual limits." 76 Courts
both can and do make practical and instrumental judgments about the
sensible bounds of judicial constitutional implementation.
For example, when the Court prescribes deference to military expertise in a First Amendment case, 77 the best understanding is not that
the First Amendment's meaning depends on the judgments of military
74. See e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Gerald L. Neuman,
The Constitutional Requirement of "Some Evidence", 25 SAN DiEo L. REv. 631 (1988).
75. Neuman, supra note 74, at 663-64 (noting that the "some evidence" requirement is not a "procedural requirement applicable to the adjudicative process of the
original decisionmaker" who is constitutionally obliged to provide due process of law).
76. Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1213-20 (1978)
77. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986).
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officials. It is that the Court has prescribed a doctrinal test that is
partly divergent from constitutional meaning. The justification for applying such a test must be that it reflects the best means of implementing the Constitution, given the limits of judicial expertise and the
potential costs ofjudicial errors.
Against the background of myriad doctrines and practices that accept a gap between constitutional "meaning" and judicial "implementation," the notion of a "prophylactic" rule loses much of its capacity to
shock and alarm. 78 Prophylactic rules stand among a cluster of wellestablished doctrines and practices justified by the requirements of
reasonably successful constitutional implementation.
B. A PartialQualification
Having stated my position somewhat starkly, I should hasten to
offer a partial qualification. In insisting on a conceptual distinction
between the Court's function of specifying the Constitution's meaning
and that of implementing the Constitution through the development
and application of sensible legal doctrines, I do not mean to suggest
that the Court typically does, or should, identify a line of demarcation
between the two. Doctrine should always be framed in light of constitutional meaning. Often, perhaps typically, it will be difficult to say
precisely where the specification of meaning leaves off and the development of implementing strategies begins.
Consider, for example, the constitutional norm prohibiting "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 79 In specifying the meaning of this
prohibition, the Court inevitably confronts a choice as to whether unreasonableness should be judged on an ad hoc or a categorical basisthat is, according to a totality-of-the-circumstances test or bright-line
rules. From one perspective, this decision involves the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. From another, the choice is not determined by
history or semantics; the question is a tactical or instrumental one, involving which approach is likely to produce better constitutional doctrine as measured in a calculus that comprehends practical costs and
benefits.8 0 In this as in many cases, the distinction between specification of meaning and implementation of constitutional norms thus
blurs at the margin.
78. See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U.
REv. 190 (1988) (defending prophylactic rules as ubiquitous).
79. U.S. CONsr., amend. IV.
80. See Fallon, supra note 66, at 77-78.
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In Dickerson, the question whether the Court can enforce a prophylactic rule was sharply framed, despite the majority's refusal to acknowledge it, only because Justice Scalia insisted-and none of the
Justices in the majority was prepared explicitly to deny-that the true
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause was reflected in the Court's
historic totality-of-the-circumstances test."1 There is some irony in Justice Scalia's enthusiastic embrace of this equation. In other contexts,
he has maintained that the rule of law-which the Constitution surely
aims to establish-requires a law of rules.8 2 In interpreting the Constitution, he has therefore argued, judges not only can, but should, specify the meaning of constitutional language by articulating rules, not
totality-of-the-circumstances tests.8 3 In prior cases describing the Miranda rules as prophylactic, however, the Court had appeared to
equate the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause with a totality-ofthe-circumstances inquiry into coercion, 4 and Justice Scalia seized on
those cases to drive his wedge between constitutional meaning and the
Miranda rules.8 5
If the gap between meaning and doctrine was sharp in Dickerson,
however, it was no more so than in some of the other examples of
constitutional implementation discussed above-no sharper, for example, than when the Court says that it will continue to accept the authority of a precedent that may well have been mistaken as an original
matter. Adherence to stare decisis in such a case explicitly subordinates the function of correctly specifying and applying constitutional
81. Having identified "compelled confession" as "what the Constitution abhors,"
530 U.S. at 424, Justice Scalia defended "the totality-of-the-circumstances" test to which
he urged the Court to return as "dispensing with the difficulty of producing a yes-or-no
answer to questions that are often better answered in shades and degrees." Id. at 433
(quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 711-12 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
82. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1175
(1989); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A
government of laws means a government of rules.").
83. See Scalia, supra note 82, at 1183 ("It is rare... that even the most vague and
general text cannot be given some precise, principled content-and that indeed is the
essence of the judicial craft.").
84. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1984).
85. Justice Scalia also rejected the position-which he ascribed to the original Miranda majority, see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 422-that the Miranda rules sufficiently reflected the Constitution's true meaning to be defended as expressing "the dictates of
the Fifth Amendment." Id.
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meaning to the function of implementing the Constitution through
stable, workable doctrine.
V.

JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY AND FIDELITY TO LAW

So far I have suggested that it is not uncommon for the Supreme
Court to promulgate doctrines that reflect, but are not perfectly determined by, constitutional meaning. Slightly more pointedly, I have
claimed that in implementing the Constitution, the Court relatively familiarly propounds and enforces doctrines that either over- or underenforce the Constitution's ultimate meaning. It is, of course, at least a
partly separate question whether it is legitimate for the Supreme Court
to do as it does.
In constitutional law, however, the line between positive and normative inquiries is not always as clear as one might wish. To Justice
86
Scalia's assertion that the Court cannot propound prophylactic rules,
it is not wholly adequate to respond as "old Ezra" is reported to have
replied when asked if he believed in infant baptism: "Believe in it?
Why, man, I've seen it done!"8 7 But even though not entirely dispositive of the legitimacy question, entrenched rules and practices that
leave a gap between constitutional meaning and implementing doctrines are by no means irrelevant either.
A.

Foundations of Legitimacy

Questions of legitimacy are often raised in constitutional law,8 8
but their meaning is seldom probed. I take such questions to operate
on two levels. The first involves fidelity to positive law: is the authority
claimed by an institution or actor, or is the action that has been taken,
consistent with prevailing law? The second question goes deeper.
Probing beyond positive law, it asks by what moral or political right a
claim of legal authority can be asserted.8 9
86. See id. at 430431.
87. Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv.L. REv. 1, 26 (1975).
88. See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 427-28 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Grano, supra note
25, at 102 (asserting that a legitimacy issue is raised by prophylactic rules pursuant to

which courts invalidate official action "without finding an actual constitutional
violation").
89. See David Copp, The Idea of a LegitimateState, 28
(using the term "legitimacy" in roughly this way).
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At the first level, it is crucial to issues of legal and judicial legitimacy that the foundations of law-including constitutional law-lie in
practices of acceptance. 90 The Constitution is law because it is widely
accepted as such by the American people and because various relevant
officials, including judges and Justices, accept the Constitution as establishing norms that bind them. 91
In asserting that the Constitution is law because it is "accepted" as
such, I do not mean to assert a more strongly affirmative claim that the
Constitution is law because it enjoys the active "consent" of the governed. Although many members of an earlier generation affirmatively
consented to be governed by the Constitution, provided that a sufficient number of others did also, the generation that gave express consent to the Constitution is long dead. Nor can the consent of that
generation directly bind successor generations. 9 2 We today are as free
to reject the Constitution as our ancestors were free to reject rule by
the British crown or the authority of the Articles of Confederation.
In the absence of active consent, the Constitution's legitimate authority does not trace solely to acceptance, but to a conjunction of acceptance with the reasonable or relative justice of the regime that the
Constitution helps to establish. 93 The existing legal order is probably
not perfect by anyone's lights. But it is, I believe, and I trust that most
Americans believe, sufficiently just so that it deserves to be supported.
Decent human lives are not possible without law. This being so, there
is a general moral obligation of citizens to support reasonablyjust legal
90. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 97-120 (Oxford 1961). Although Hart
suggested that the relevant social practices centrally involved "rules" and in particular a
"rule of recognition," this formulation is probably misleading, and should not obscure
Hart's deeper insight. See Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositionsof a Constitution, in

RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

145, 150 (Sanford Levinson, ed. 1995). Even Professor Dworkin, the modern jurisprudential writer widely regarded as Hart's great rival, seems to agree that the
starting point for understanding law must be accepted legal "practice." See RONALD
DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 254-58, 397-99 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
AMENDMENT

91.

See Schauer, supra note 90, at 153.

92. This was a point that troubled at least some members of the founding generation, including Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson. See STEPHEN HOLEIS, PASSIONS
AND CONSTRAINTr: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 138-50 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1995).

93. For a partly parallel argument, see Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 169-76 (Larry Alexander ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
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unless there is substan-

tial prospect of their swift and relatively non-violent replacement by
more just institutions. If this premise is accepted, our Constitutionlike that of many other nation-states-tends in Joseph Raz's term to be
"self-validating" 95 or self-legitimating: a regime of law being so necessary for human well-being, the accepted constitution is "legitimate" if it

is reasonably just.
B.

Legitimacy and Unwritten ConstitutionalNorms

When the notion of constitutional legitimacy is traced to the phenomenon of acceptance and standards of reasonable justice, the question arises whether the Supreme Court might be empowered to
implement the Constitution by accepted, normatively defensible, and
therefore valid, legal norms that cannot be derived directly from the
written Constitution itself. With the question framed in this way, my

submission-which is original only it its details-would be that the
96
United States has unwritten as well as written constitutional norms.
These unwritten norms, which collectively embody what might be described as an "unwritten constitution," help to define and legitimate a
judicial role that is as concerned with successful constitutional implementation as it is with the ascertainment of the written Constitution's

one true meaning. This may seem an unnecessarily tendentious way of
expressing the familiar, even banal point that the Constitution does
not and indeed could not fully specify the rules for its own interpreta94. SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 115 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (identifying a "fundamental natural duty" of "justice" that "requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us"); see also Raz, supra note 93, at 169-76
(explaining the "self-validating" character of many existing constitutions in light of the
need for a regime of law).
95. Raz, supra note 93, at 173 ("As long as they remain with the boundaries set by
moral principles, constitutions are self-validating in that their validity derives from nothing more than the fact that they are there.") (emphasis omitted).
96. Earlier works specifically suggesting that the United States has an unwritten as
well as a written constitution include Wit.uAm BENNETr MUNRO, THE MAKERS OF THE
UNwNRrrrEN CONSTrrUTION 1-23 (MacMillan Co. 1930); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE
UN VRIrEN CONSTrTmON OF THE UNrrED STATES 43-45 (1890); Thomas Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 710-14 (1975). See also BRUCE
AcERmAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATONS 44-50, 81-130 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991)
(arguing that the Constitution has undergone unvritten amendments); David A.
Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CH. L. REV. 877, 905-06 (1996)
(arguing that constitutional law has developed in a common-law-like manner including
the adoption of what are effectively unwritten amendments).
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tion. 97 But I mean my claim to cut deeper. What the Court properly
does is not alwaysjust "a matter of interpretation"9 8 of the written Constitution. As in Miranda and Dickerson, the Court sometimes goes beyond interpretation to establish rules that it thinks desirable or
appropriate to implement constitutional values, even though those
rules are not uniquely dictated by and do not perfectly express the
Constitution's meaning.
In distinction from some others who have advanced similar arguments about the existence of unwritten constitutional norms, I would
maintain that the unwritten norms complement or supplement the
written Constitution, rather than contradicting or displacing it.99 In
both Miranda and Dickerson, the Constitution authoritatively establishes
the relevant norm or value. The Court's authority is not to displace
that norm, but to exercise practical judgment and necessary or appropriate creativity in ensuring that the constitutional norm is successfully
implemented in practice. The Court's continued acceptance of "erroneous" precedent can be understood in similar terms. Judicial doctrine need not perfectly embody constitutional meaning. An initially
doubtful or even erroneous ruling can justifiably be retained and enforced if it reflects and promotes underlying values reasonably well,
especially when its replacement would do more to retard than advance
the overall project of constitutional implementation. Again, however,
the reasonableness or acceptability of an implementing doctrine must
be measured against underlying constitutional norms. A precedent
that is too flatly erroneous should therefore command no adherence,
as is recognized in virtually every account of stare decisis.100
VI.

THE CONTESTABILITY OF JUDICIAL "LEGITIMACY '

The need to trace claims ofjudicial legitimacy to unwritten constitutional norms validated largely by "acceptance" is admittedly unsettling. Among other things, acceptance is a vague concept, and claims
of acceptance are almost inherently problematic. The mass public un97. See generally Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 63 S. CAL.
L. REv. 107 (1989) (arguing that the United States does not have an unwritten constitution in any significant sense of the term).
98. SCALIA, supra note 58.
99. Compare ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 40-57, 99-104 (arguing that unwritten
amendments have rejected previously binding constitutional norms).
100.
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 419 (citing precedents recognizing that "stare decisis
is not an inexorable command") (internal quotations omitted).
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doubtedly knows little of prevailing judicial practices. In one sense it
accepts judicial rulings, especially those by the Supreme Court, as the
lawful dictates of a legitimate authority-not as what H.L.A. Hart described as the orders of a "gunman... writ large." 10' Still, the depth
and breadth of public acceptance are substantially indeterminate.
Among high-ranking public officials and especially among the judiciary, greater awareness surely exists concerning the role that the Supreme Court actually plays, and claims of a more robust acceptance of
familiar practices might therefore seem more plausible if it were not
for the well-known phenomenon of methodological debate.' 0 2 As in
Dickerson itself, the Justices themselves dispute the proper specification
of the judicial role.
In this context, contested questions concerning the existence of
unwritten rules, practices, and norms could only be answered by a mix
of empirical and normative argument. 10 3 Notwithstanding disagreement even among those at the center of legal practice, it is impossible,
as Professor Dworkin has argued, for an individual observer (or participant) to understand or "interpret" that practice without treating certain of its features as provisionally fixed and central. 10 4 A theory that
explains and justifies the central, constitutive features of the legal regime-one that shows them in the "best" light, in Dworkin's
terms' 0 5-may then be developed and applied to resolve other contested cases concerning the existence and proper specification of surrounding legal norms.
This, roughly, has been my method in this essay. I have cited a
number of practices of constitutional implementation, not simple ascertainment and application of the Constitution's "meaning," that I
take to be practically ineradicable from constitutional law. These have
included judicial practices involving adherence to initially erroneous
precedent, the design of constitutional remedies, standards ofjudicial
review that diverge from ultimate constitutional meanings, and underenforced constitutional norms. Treating these practices as central, I
have argued that a good interpretation of accepted law would depict
101. H.La. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Hlv.L. REv.
593, 603 (1958).
102. See generally DwORMKN, supra note 90, at 3-4, 13 (observing that law is an "argumentative" practice). For a discussion of competing constitutional theories, see Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a ConstitutionalTheory, 87 CAL. L. REv. 535 (1999).
103. See DWORKIN, supra note 90, at 45-113.
104. See id. at 65-66.
105. Id. at 52-53.
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the Court as authorized to perform a more general function of constitutional implementation encompassing an authority to propound prophylactic rules.
While proceeding in this way, I readily acknowledge the limits of
my approach. Dispute abounds about which features of existing practice must be provisionally accepted as fixed and central, as well as
about which depiction of the practice would show it in the best light
and provide the best guidance for the future. No one's theorizing is
likely to make this dispute disappear. This is an uncomfortable fact.
Equally uncomfortable is the consequence that flows from it: in a society that relies heavily on unwritten legal and constitutional norms, as
ours does, judicial legitimacy is inherently contestable and potentially
precarious. However much the Court might wish to pretend it were
otherwise, frequently the Justices cannot say: "The Constitution, as
construed in light of norms that no reasonable person could reject,
uniquely mandated the result that we reach." The more honest account would be: "This is the course we judge most sensible and appropriate under the circumstances, given our admittedly contestable
understanding of our role, which is defined by unwritten as well as
written constitutional norms."
There is a natural craving for some firmer rock of certainty on
which to build an account of the judicial role and its legitimacy. But
perhaps a contestable and potentially precarious legitimacy is all that
an unelected Court making practical judgments of enormous import
could ever possess or even deserve.
VII.

LEGrrIMACY, UNWRITrEN NoRMs, AND ISSUES OF JUDICIAL ROLE

Although I have maintained that the legitimacy of the written and
unwritten constitutions both rest on the same conceptual foundations
of widespread acceptance and reasonable justice, I have not meant to
deny that there may be important sociological differences. To the extent that legitimacy depends on widespread acceptance, the legitimacy
of the written Constitution is more widely and deeply accepted-as an
empirical or sociological matter-than the legitimacy of the unwritten
Constitution. The Court clearly apprehends this disparity. Indeed,
this apprehension almost certainly helps to explain why, in Dickerson,
the Court hesitated to claim explicitly a power to issue prophylactic
rules that would depend for their legitimacy on unwritten constitutional norms. For the Court to have appealed expressly to unwritten
norms might well have provoked a legitimacy debate spilling beyond
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the Court to politicians and the public. The Justices in the majority
clearly preferred to avoid this outcome.
In the face of the legitimacy challenge posed by Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion, the Court's performance in Dickerson was a disappointment. Legitimacy requires reasonable justice, not just a passive
and contestable acceptance. And for a non-majoritarian institution
such as the Court, justice imports articulate justification.' 0 6 The best
defense ofjudicial review resides largely in the idea that the discipline
of focused deliberation and public reason-giving will produce better
answers to practical and constitutional problems than would the less
disciplined, less articulately reasoned decisions of other branches of
07
government.'
Measured against this standard, ChiefJustice Rehnquist's Dickerson
opinion comes up short. Deliberately opaque, the opinion gives only a
shallow, question-begging justification for the Court's disputed authority to impose its ruling. The concerned citizen is entitled to ask for
more and to worry that the Justices must sometimes perform better if
they are to deserve the trust that they exercise. In the long run, the
Court must earn its legitimacy.
It would be a mistake, however, to believe that legitimacy questions always have yes-or-no answers. Legitimacy is often a matter of
degree, involving intertwined elements of adherence to accepted legal
norms and overall substantive and procedural justice. Moreover, the
Court is composed of practical lawyers, not philosophers. As practical
lawyers, the Justices know that the best rhetorical strategy for maintaining at least a shallow acceptance of their role among the public-one
of the component variables in the calculus of legitimacy-is sometimes
to be less than wholly forthcoming. An effort at full, deep justification
might stir opposition, not acceptance, and might ignite political controversy in which the Court is ill-equipped to defend itself. This is
among the tensions in the role of a less than Herculean Supreme

Court that must struggle to maintain its legitimacy.
Under the circumstances, Dickerson was not a simple abdication of
judicial responsibility. As an institution of practical government, the
106. See Frank I. Michelman, Justification (andJustifiability) of Law in a Contradictory
World, inJUSTInFICATION 71, 82-87 (J. Roland Pennock &John Chapman eds., NewYork
Univ. Press 1986); David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicialCandor, 100 HAv. L. REv. 731,

737 (1987) (terming "reasoned response to reasoned argument" an "essential aspect" of
the judicial process).

107.

See Fallon, supra note 66, at 142.
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Court could not function effectively if obliged to bare and debate the
deepest foundations of its reasoning whenever a challenge is raised. As
a practical matter, a relatively cryptic invocation of widely accepted
norms-such as stare decisis and the precept that the Supreme Court
has no "supervisory power" over state courts-must sometimes suffice.
Nonetheless, the absence of full candor and articulate justification
on the part of the Supreme Court is always a cause for regret. At the
very least, it is a signal that the Court has failed fully to satisfy the ideal
ofjudicial excellence, and indeed ofjudicial legitimacy, even if its failure may be wholly understandable and in some sense even excusable.
This is among the lessons that I learned from Harry Wellington, who
once wrote, memorably, that an institution playing the role of our Supreme Court should have "Reason, not Power" as "the motto over its
door."10

108.

Wellington, supra note 1, at 247.

